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Executive Summary 
 
Eighteen months have been passed since the new legislation came into force and we 
believe that now is the right moment to bring up few interesting aspects that are very 
important when discussing whether certain reform will be successful in the long-run 
or not. In this paper we show that the participants in the Macedonian pension 
scheme are encountering high opportunity costs. In order to overcome this 
problem the investment strategies of pension funds should be immediately 
reconsidered in order to allow appropriate diversification across instruments and 
countries! Secondly, having in mind the current situation in our economy and the 
level of development in our capital market we believe that the investment restrictions 
should be relaxed were the medium-term goal should be moving towards a ‘prudent-
person’ rule. Thirdly, the fees and charges are too high and should be immediately 
reassessed by the pension funds. However, this refers also refers to the government 
institutions. Finally, funds should be able to compete in offering different risk-return 
investment strategies to their participants. Instead of all participants being forced to 
hold the same portfolio they should be able to choose according to their risk 
tolerance and age. If this is not possible than more radical solution might be 
replacement of the mandatory second pillar with voluntary DC scheme. In this way 
the participants will be able to choose funds with clearly defined investment strategy 
(according to their ‘prospect’). This will create big incentives for improved 
efficiencies in investment management and performance because the retirement 
plans will be offered purely on a competitive basis. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In the last 50 years of socialism the Macedonian pension system was based on so-
called Intergenerational Solidarity or Pay-As-You-Go system1. This is by no means a 
bad model especially having in mind the socio-economic and demographic 
circumstances. Moreover, this model was also practiced by many European countries 
with great success regardless of their political system. However, there were several 
factors and trends in the last few decades that initiated a big debate in the academic 
community (mainly in the developed countries) concerning the sustainability of this 
model and the urgent need for reforms for all pension funds organized in this 
manner. Namely, those factors can be classified into two major categories: 
demographic and socio-economic. 
 
The crucial issue for the stability of any Pay-As-You-Go system is the ratio between 
the current number of employees and the people receiving pension benefits. This is 
because the system itself is ‘currently financed’.2 In the case of Macedonia, the growth 
of the population was stagnating. This ageing of population resulted in increased 
number of individuals entitled to receive pension benefits. In addition, life expectancy 
has been constantly rising thus creating a big gap in the future pension fund liabilities. 
 
Like in many other transition countries, the process of privatization resulted in harsh 
consequences. As the global market was putting pressure on Macedonian economy, 
unemployment was constantly growing and the country was lagging in economic 
development. This process created increasingly severe market conditions. The ratio 
between current number of employees and people receiving pension benefits was 
decreasing dramatically. In 1993 for the first time in the history a serious financial 
crisis hit the Macedonian pension system. This event created increased awareness for 
urgent need of reforms both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, it also 
became clear that maintaining the current pay-as-you-go system was impossible. 
                                                 
1 Pay-As-You-Go systems are currently financed, or in other words pension benefits are paid 
from the current contributions made by each employed individual. 
2 Present pension liabilities are paid out with the capital accumulated from the obligatory 
contributions made by employees, employers or both through the duration of the participants 
working life. 
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Namely, Macedonia was facing highly undesirable alternatives if attempts to preserve 
this model (either trough tax increase, reducing the pension benefits or some 
combination of both). 
 
International financial institutions such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund also showed interest for providing help regarding this matter. Due to 
the fact that the Macedonian government had limited capacity for independent 
preparation of its macroeconomic policies and projections as well as measures for 
their implementation, the international financial institutions had big influence and can 
be considered as the main driving force for the reforms that followed. 
 
The fiscal preasures were reduced by increasing the level of contributions (by more 
than 10% from the initial level), increasing the minimum years necessary for 
retirement (by 5% for males and 10% for females), changing the formula for 
calculating pension benefits in terms of estimating the average payment and reducing 
percentage of average payment, together with more strict requirements for 
retirement. Despite the fact that almost all changes were perceived by the general 
public as very unpopular, they were inevitable because if nothing was changed at the 
end the whole system would collapse. 
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II. The Macedonian Pension System 
 
All implemented measures between 1993 and 1998 were temporary and only directed 
for maintaining short-term stability of the system. The actual reform in the 
Macedonian pension system was initiated in 1997. The legal framework was passed in 
2000 and started to be implemented from 1st of January 2006. The new system is 
based on several core principles such as: mandatory-funding and privately managed 
funds, protection of interest of all participants in the pension scheme, ensuring 
availability of financial and social security for its members, rights of its members 
conditional on the length and amount of contributions, safety of pension fund assets 
and asset diversification. Furthermore, it is expected to provide grater long-term 
stability. 
 
This is by no means exclusive for Macedonia3, or for any other country from CEE. In 
fact similar reforms can be also identified across EU where publicly funded Pay-As-
You-Go systems are present. At this moment in Macedonia we have a pension 
system based on three pillars (also called mixed pension scheme): 
 
? First pillar, which is obligatory and by definition operates as Pay-As-You-Go 
system. 
? Second pillar, again obligatory but operates as privately managed Defined 
Contribution pension scheme, and 
? Third pillar which is Defined Contribution model but it is voluntarily. 
 
The second pillar can be considered as a major transformation and challenge with 
respect to our previous system.4 However, it also raises serious questions why it has 
been accepted especially bearing in mind the ongoing debate in the academic 
community for more favourable ‘two pillar pension schemes’.5 Nevertheless, our 
                                                 
3 The reform is already implemented in Hungary, Bulgaria and Serbia, while in Romania is already 
under way. 
4 The third pillar is not much of a concern at this moment due to the fact that it is not 
operational. 
5 Replacement of pay-as-you-go and obligatory defined contribution with one fully funded 
defined benefit. 
www.crpm.org.mk  8
intension is to see how the reform is being implemented in practice without getting 
involved in this debate. 
 
By definition, with DC retirement plan (second pillar) a certain amount or percentage 
of salary is set aside each month by the company for the benefit of its employees. 
There are restrictions as to when and how you can withdraw these funds without 
penalties. There is no way to know how much the plan will ultimately give the 
employee upon retiring. It depends entirely on the accumulated contribution and 
their investment performance. The amount contributed is fixed,6 but the benefit is 
not. Consequently, two individuals with identical contributions but different 
investment portfolios can receive completely different pension benefits. This implies 
that with this pension scheme all investment risk is transferred to the participant. 
 
With this study we will try empirically to support our view that there is big failure in 
the process of implementation. Furthermore, we will try to answer whether this 
model is sustainable in the long-run or not? The crucial question is how quickly the 
system should be liberalized, and whether the pension funds are able to deliver returns by taking 
justifiable risk and at the same time operating within the legally imposed restrictions? Therefore, 
the objective is to conduct a comparative study covering Bulgaria, Macedonia and 
Croatia. By looking at the portfolio composition, investment performance and the 
fees7 charged by the funds and supervisory institutions, we will try to see whether the 
participants in the Macedonian pension system are encountering any opportunity cost. Finally, we 
will discuss the current legislation of minimum 80% investments in different (debt 
and equity) instrument ONLY in Macedonia, which is contrary to one of the core 
principles on which our new pension system is based (diversification of investments and 
safety of pension fund assets)! 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 This is true only to certain extend because even in this plans changing the level of contribution 
is possible (e.g. due to changes in taxation). 
7 Fees will be compared in absolute and relative terms. For example: 1% management fee on net 
asset value is not the same if the portfolio composition is 5% equity and 95% short-term fixed 
income securities, compared with fund who invests 100% in equity. 
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III. Legal Restrictions 
 
The regulation of asset management is probably the most important part of pension 
regulation. It is also referred as investment regulation or portfolio regulation of 
pension funds. One of the main objectives of the regulation is to ensure that 
portfolios are well diversified. In addition, it also eliminates very risky and illiquid 
assets from the range of investment opportunities. However, all investment 
restrictions may be in principle counterproductive. They may prevent diversification 
and expose the participants to a greater degree of portfolio risk. 
 
In general, there are two basic approaches to investment regulation of pension funds: 
‘prudent person’ rule and ‘quantitative’ restrictions. The regulations typically involve 
ceilings on holdings by issuer, by type of instrument, by risk, by concentration of 
ownership, and by asset class. First four restrictions are considered as non-
controversial prudential rules. They have been adopted by many developed countries. 
On the other hand, the restrictions by asset class represent one specific area of 
regulation that is creating much more controversy in recent years. They are set in 
order to establish boundaries of investment choices. The following table describes 
the current regulation in several countries. 
 
Table 1 
Pension asset regulation 
 
 Domestic International 
Prudent person 
Austria N/a no limits 
Australia No limits no limits 
Iceland N/a no foreign investments by public-
sector funds 
Ireland no limits no limits 
Netherlands no limits no limits 
New Zealand no limits no limits 
Spain N/a no limits in other OECD countries 
United Kingdom no limits no limits 
United States no limits no limits 
Asset limits 
Belgium Minimum 15% in public bonds, maximum 40% in
property, 10% in deposits 
no foreign investments 
Canada 7% maximum on property tax on foreign assets over 10% 
Czech Republic N/a no foreign investments 
Denmark Minimum 60% in domestic debt; property, equities and 20% limit 
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mutual funds maximum 40% 
Finland N/a 20% limit in other EU states 
France minimum 50% in EU public bonds (AGIRC/ ARRCO)
minimum 34% in public bonds, 40% limit on property
and 15% Treasury deposits (insured funds) 
no foreign assets (insured funds) 
Germany guidelines: 30% limit on EU equities, 25% EU property 20% limit on foreign assets overall;
6% limit on non-EU equities, 6% on
non-EU bonds 
Greece N/a 20% limit on domestically based
mutual funds, which can invest
abroad 
Italy limited to public bonds, deposits, property, mortgages,
investment funds (insured funds) 
no limits 
Japan guidelines (being phased out): 30% limit on equities,
20% property; minimum 50% bonds 
30% limit on foreign assets; 10%
limit in any one country 
Norway 20% limit on equities, 30% on private bonds or loans no limits 
Portugal minimum 30% in public bonds, 50% limit on property 40% limit 
Poland 20% limit on bank deposits or securities, 40% in listed
equities, 15% in open-ended investment funds, 5% in
closed-end funds, 15% in publicly traded municipal
bonds, 5% in non-traded bonds 
5% limit on foreign assets 
Sweden majority of investments in listed bonds and loans 5-10% limit, depending on type of
fund 
Switzerland 30% limit on equities, 55% on property 30% total limit 
Macedonia 30% limit on listed equities; 
property, commodity and derivatives investments
prohibited 
20% total limit 
 
Note: N/a indicates data are unavailable. 
Source: Laboul (1992), Davis (1998), EFRP (1996), Watson Wyatt (1997), Chlon, Gora and 
Rutkowski (1998). 
 
It can be noticed from the table that there is a group of countries that does not 
impose restrictions by asset class.8 The regulatory framework in these countries are 
said to follow the prudent person rule. It simply requires that those who are 
responsible for making the investment decisions are considering the specific 
circumstances of the fund. Furthermore, it allows high risk assets to be included in 
the pension portfolio as long as the risk is being hedged. 
 
The second group of countries (including Macedonia) impose quantitative 
restrictions, which are simple and very easy for monitoring. The main criticism 
regarding the quantitative restrictions is focussed on the prohibition of (or low limits 
on) investments in foreign assets. However, Macedonia has additional distinctive 
feature. Namely, according to the current legislation all foreign securities that are qualified 
for inclusion in the portfolio of Macedonian pension funds must by issued by legal entities or 
                                                 
8 The only existing restriction is related to the instruction that the portfolio must be managed 
prudently. This is usually the case for Anglo-Saxon countries and the Netherlands. 
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Governments that have credit rating ‘A’ or higher according to Fitch Investor Service or 
Standard & Poor's, alternatively ‘A2’ or higher according Moody's. If we take into 
consideration that Macedonia has ‘BB+’ rating according to Standard & Poor's than 
we can safely make a statement that currently more than 99% of the pension fund 
assets are invested in ‘below investment grade’ securities.9 This is contrary to one 
of the core principles according to the Law for Fully Funded Pension Insurance – 
‘safety’ of pension fund assets. Additionally, the tendency to use pension funds as a 
source for financing government debt is also causing serious concerns! 
 
Finally, there is evidence that real returns of pension funds in prudent man 
environments have been higher than the returns of funds operating in more 
restrictive environments.10 This can be largely (but not completely) attributed to 
larger share of equity that is being held in their portfolios. The literature on pension 
fund regulation generally concludes that investment restrictions may be initially 
justified in emerging countries introducing private pension schemes, particularly 
those introducing a mandatory second pillar.11 There is also a consensus on the need 
for those restrictions to be relaxed over time. However, this should be in line with the 
development of institutions and instruments, improvements in the depth and liquidity 
of securities markets, and also improvements in the overall legal framework. The 
long-run objective would be accepting the prudent man approach, where minimal 
restrictions are imposed. 
 
At this stage the legal quantitative restrictions in Macedonia do not impose any 
investment constraints because Macedonian pension funds stayed well within their 
officially imposed limits. However, we believe that they should be reconsidered 
especially having in mind the current situation in our economy and the level of 
development in our capital market. 
 
                                                 
9 If our country has credit rating BB+ than we can safely assume that the situation regarding the 
major part of Macedonian companies is even worse. Having sad that, we shouldn’t wonder why 
so far there is not a single Macedonian company that asked to be assessed by any internationally 
recognized rating agency. 
10 Many studies (such as OECD (1998), Davis (1995 and 1997), etc.) have reached the same 
conclusions. 
11 Rocha, R., Gutierrez, J., and Hinz, “Improving the regulation and supervision of pension 
funds: Are there lessons from the banking sector?”, World Bank, 1999. 
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IV. Asset Allocation & Performance 
 
What is somehow distinct for many developing counties (including Macedonia) is that 
participants do not have the possibility to tailor their portfolio to the level of risk they 
wish to take. Namely, despite the fact that individuals are bearing all the investment 
risk they are disconnected from the decision makers. They are unable to choose their 
investment policies and therefore they do not have control over the level of risk 
taken by the funds managing their portfolio. 
 
By seriously limiting the ‘investment freedom’ through legal restrictions the regulators 
(or the Government) is exercising caution. They are trying to reduce the possibility 
for scenarios like retiring poor, bearing unnecessary risk and being forced to make 
investment decisions in which individuals have little or no experience. This is 
reasonable to certain extent. However, it also creates overregulated environment in 
which pension funds are operating. 
 
The investment constraints can produce undesirable effects contrary to initial 
expectations. Consequently, our main objective is to conduct a comparative study 
covering Bulgaria, Macedonia and Croatia. Since all countries have same (or very 
similar) pension systems it will be interesting to see the allocation across different 
asset classes. Furthermore, we will try to see whether the fees and charges deducted 
by the providers for managing pension fund assets are higher in Macedonia or not. 
Finally, according to the current portfolio we will run a model in order to see the 
hypothetical outcome of returns generated by the investments. This will give us a 
clear indication of what can be done in order to improve the long-run sustainability 
of Macedonian pension system. 
 
The allocation across different asset classes is given in the following charts. 
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Figure 1 
Investment portfolio of OPF (Occupational Pension Funds)12 in Bulgaria as of 
31.12.2006 
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1. Government securities 
2. Shares 
3. Corporate bonds 
4. Municipal bonds 
5. Bank deposits 
6. Mortgage bonds 
7. Real estate 
8. Investments abroad 
 
 
33.11% 
21.17% 
10.86% 
0.58% 
20.96% 
5.01% 
1.23% 
7.08% 
Source: Bulgarian Financial Supervision Commission (KFN) 
 
Figure 2 
Investment portfolio of UPF (Universal Pension Funds)13 in Bulgaria as of 
31.12.2006 
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1. Government securities 
2. Shares 
3. Corporate bonds 
4. Municipal bonds 
5. Bank deposits 
6. Mortgage bonds 
7. Real estate 
8. Investments abroad 
 
 
32.26% 
19.54% 
12.79% 
0.38% 
21.51% 
4.72% 
0.80% 
8.00% 
Source: Bulgarian Financial Supervision Commission (KFN) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 192.825 members are participating in 8 OPF: Doverie, Saglasie, DSK-Rodina, Allianz Bulgaria, 
ING, CCB-Sila, Lukoil Garant-Bulgaria and DZI. 
13 2.442.701 members are participating in 8 UPF: Doverie, Saglasie, DSK-Rodina, Allianz 
Bulgaria, ING, CCB-Sila, Lukoil Garant-Bulgaria and DZI. 
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Figure 3 
Investment portfolio of OPF (Obligatory Pension Funds)14 in Croatia as of 
31.12.2006 
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1. Government securities 
2. Shares 
3. Municipal bonds 
4. Corporate bonds 
5. Mutual funds 
6. Short-term securities 
7. Bank deposits 
8. Cash 
9. Receivables 
10. Investments abroad 
 
71.35% 
5.31% 
0.40% 
2.97% 
7.15% 
0.10% 
1.97% 
0.80% 
0.85% 
9.10% 
Source: Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency (HANFA) 
 
Figure 4 
Investment portfolio of OPF (Obligatory Pension Funds)15 in Macedonia as of 
31.12.2006 
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1. Government securities 
2. Shares (domestic) 
3. Bank deposits 
 
 
 
79.26% 
3.80% 
16.95% 
Source: Macedonian Agency for Supervision of Fully Funded Pension Insurance (MAPAS) 
 
According to the charts presented above the diversification of assets managed by the 
Macedonian pension funds is well behind when compared with Bulgaria and Croatia. 
Regarding the country allocation, almost the entire portfolio is invested in 
Macedonian securities creating (country/currency) overexposure. In addition, there is 
huge difference with respect to financial instruments (or asset classes) included in the 
portfolio. Namely, in Macedonia almost 80% of the portfolio is allocated in fixed-
income securities issued (or guaranteed) by the Government. Since we have ‘highly 
                                                 
14 1.322.010 members are participating in 4 Obligatory Pension Funds: AZ, Erste, PBZ/CO and 
Raiffeisen. 
15 128.031 members are participating in 2 Obligatory Pension Funds: NPF and KB POPF. 
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conservative’ and ‘passive’ buy-and-hold16 investment strategy even unsophisticated 
and inexperienced investors can easily manage their own portfolio of this kind. 
Having said that, it becomes questionable why the Macedonian participants are paying ‘entry’ 
and management fees for this type of portfolio composition? 
 
We strongly believe that the ‘time dimension’ is important argument in highly 
dynamic industry such as asset management because each period has its own 
distinctive features favouring different type of securities and sectors. However, this 
issue shouldn’t, under any circumstances, be considered as a factor in the process of 
portfolio composition from the stand point of how many months pension funds are 
operating. At any point in time, the portfolio should be well diversified and 
positioned for the highest income generation. However, just for illustration we 
compared the portfolio composition in our sample of countries approximately 18 
months after the reform was implemented. 
 
Figure 5 
Investment portfolio in Bulgaria as of 31.12.2003 
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1. Government securities 
2. Shares 
3. Bank deposits 
4. Municipal bonds 
5. Real estate 
6. Investments abroad 
 
 
68,97% 
13.68% 
16.12% 
0.50% 
0.72% 
0.02% 
Source: Bulgarian Financial Supervision Commission (KFN) 
                                                 
16 It is an investment strategy of holding securities for the long term while ignoring short-term 
price fluctuations. 
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Figure 6 
Investment portfolio of OPF in Croatia as of 31.12.2003 
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1. Government securities 
2. Shares 
3. Corporate bonds 
4. Short-term securities 
5. Bank deposits 
6. Cash 
7. Investments abroad 
 
 
69.81% 
3.44% 
3.03% 
11.22% 
1.18% 
2.61% 
8.71% 
Source: Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency (HANFA) 
 
Figure 7 
Investment portfolio in Macedonia as of 31.06.2007 
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1. Government securities 
2. Shares (domestic) 
3. Bank deposits 
4. Investments abroad 
 
 
 
76.47% 
8.39% 
14.20% 
0.89% 
Source: Macedonian Agency for Supervision of Fully Funded Pension Insurance (MAPAS) 
 
Again similar conclusion can be reached after controlling for the time dimension. 
Macedonia is still behind in terms of diversification. Finally, we will compare the 
differences in achieved returns because sometimes holding a less diversified portfolio 
might be beneficial if it can provide better risk-adjusted returns. However, as shown 
in the following table, the investment performance is significantly lower in 
Macedonia. For the first 18 months of their existence, the returns of best performing 
fund in Macedonia is approximately 50% lower when compared with the returns of 
best performing fund in Bulgaria. This is an incredible underperformance. 
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Table 2 
Investment returns 
 
Country Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia
Date 31.12.2003 31.12.2003 31.06.2007
Fund/ 
Returns 
Universal 
Doverie 
Saglasie 
DSK-Rodina 
Allianz 
ING Bulgaria 
CCB-Sila 
Lukoil Garant-
Bulgaria 
DZI 
Occupational 
Doverie 
Saglasie 
DSK-Rodina 
Allianz 
ING Bulgaria 
CCB-Sila 
Lukoil Garant-
Bulgaria 
DZI 
 
-24,4% 
-24,1% 
-18,4% 
-17,8% 
-26,2% 
-22,6%
-26,1% 
 
N/a 
 
-23,8% 
-23,8% 
-22,7% 
-20,9% 
-24,8% 
-23,4% 
-23,0% 
 
N/a 
 
AZ Fond 
Erste Plavi 
Raiffeisen 
PBZ Croatia
 
-16,8% 
-16,1% 
-16,2% 
-18,0%
 
NPF 
KB POPF 
 
-11,6% 
-12,3%
 
Note: N/a indicates data are unavailable. 
Source: Bulgarian Financial Supervision Commission (KFN), Macedonian Agency for Supervision 
of Fully Funded Pension Insurance (MAPAS), PBZ Croatia Osiguranje, Raiffeisen Mirovinski 
Fond, Erste Plavi Mirovinski Fond, and AZ Fond 
 
The situation is even worse if we look at the Macedonian market in isolation. By 
creating a synthetic portfolio of Macedonian securities only (70% fixed-income and 
30% equities) and using it as a benchmark, the underperformance is even higher. 
However, this is mainly due to the spectacular Bull Run on the Macedonian Stock 
Exchange in the last 24 months. Regardless of what kind of comparison we make the 
empirical evidence is showing that there is a big failure in the process of 
implementation! 
 
Finally, it appears that Macedonian pension funds are in so-called ‘learning by 
doing’ phase while the participants in the pension scheme are encountering high 
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opportunity costs. On the contrary, the investment process in countries with 
developed capital markets is usually divided into five steps:17 
 
? Asset Liability Management (ALM)18 that will eventually lead to a policy mix 
? Strategic asset allocation 
? Tactical asset allocation 
? Country, sector, style allocation within an asset 
? Individual security selection 
 
The following table shows the initial steps that are usually taken in determining the 
investment policy and ALM. 
 
Table 3 
 
Objectives Constraints Policies 
Return requirements Liquidity Asset allocation 
Risk tolerance Horizon Diversification 
 Regulation Risk positioning 
 Taxes Tax positioning 
 Unique Needs Income generation 
 
The second step, determining the strategic asset allocation: 
 
According to conventional (or conservative) approach the composition pension 
fund assets are usually as a percentage of: Equity, Government Bonds, and Real 
Estate. However, according to recent trends in developed capital markets more and 
more assets are entering pension fund’s portfolio such as: Private Equity, Credit 
Bonds, High Yield and Emerging Markets Debt, Index Linked Bonds, Hedge Funds, 
Commodities, Infrastructure, etc. 
 
                                                 
17 It becomes obvious that Macedonian pension funds are ‘unfamiliar’ with those steps (or at 
least they are acting in such way). 
18 A risk management technique designed to earn an adequate return while maintaining a 
comfortable surplus of assets beyond liabilities. The process includes formulating, implementing, 
monitoring and revising strategies related to assets and liabilities in an attempt to achieve 
financial objectives for a given set of risk tolerances and constraints (Source: 
www.investorword.com). 
www.crpm.org.mk  19
There is a major advantage when incorporating more alternative assets classes in the 
portfolio. Namely, they can offer uncorrelated returns although sometimes lower 
than the rest of the asset classes. Additional trend is lower equity risk premium, more 
active management as a source of extra return, SRI (Socially Responsible 
Investments) and Corporate Governance.  
 
The third step, determining the tactical asset allocation: 
 
The tactical asset allocation is done for short-term, usually covering a period between 
3 and 12 months. Namely, it is based on the market sentiment and economic 
scenarios. Output is tactical allocation shift (under and overweighting) to certain 
assets on a regular basis. 
 
The fourth step, determining the country, sector and style allocation within an asset: 
 
? Equities: which region do we like most, are sectors becoming more important 
than the countries (“global sectors”), should we buy large or small stocks, how 
much private equity… 
? Fixed Income: allocation between government bonds, credits, index linked, 
high yield, emerging market debt, etc. 
? Real Estate: hotels versus houses, direct versus indirect, alternative versus 
conventional etc. 
? Hedge Funds: which hedge fund style do we choose? 
? Commodities: Oil or Gold? 
 
The fifth step, buying individual securities: 
 
? Equities: stock selection 
? Fixed Income: finding under-priced securities 
? Real Estate 
? Hedge Funds: which hedge funds given the certain style 
? How to trade securities without severe penalty of transaction costs 
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1. Fees & Charges 
 
The following table gives brief summary of all fees and charges deducted by the 
providers for managing pension fund assets. 
 
Table 4 
Fees paid by the participants in OPF 
 
 Entry fee Management fee Bank fee Exit fee 
Bulgaria 
- Doverie 
- Saglasie 
- DSK-Rodina 
- Allianz 
– ING Bulgaria 
- CCB-Sila 
- Lukoil Garant-
Bulgaria 
- DZI 
Same for all: 
5% from 
each 
contribution 
Same for all: 
1% from net 
assets 
No fee Same for all: 
- Approximately 10 EUR 
Croatia19 
- AZ 
- Erste 
- Raiffeisen 
- PBZ/CO 
 
0.7%20 
0.8% 
0.6% 
0.8% 
 
1.2% 
1.2% 
0.95% 
1.2% 
 
0.07% 
0.08% 
N/а 
0.065% 
Same for all: 
Year 1 – 0.8% 
Year 2 - 0.4% 
Year 3 – 0.2% 
After year 3 no charge 
Macedonia 
- KB POPF 
- NPF 
Same for all: 
8.5%21 from 
each 
contribution 
 
Same for all: 
0.05% 
monthly fee of 
total net assets
Included 
in entry 
fee 
Same for all: 
< 6 months – 9% 
6-11 moths - 6.75% 
12-17 months – 4.5% 
18-23 months – 2.25% 
> 24 months – no charge 
Note: N/a indicates data are unavailable. 
Sources: Bulgarian Financial Supervision Commission (KFN), Croatian Financial Services 
Supervisory Agency (HANFA), Macedonian Agency for Supervision of Fully Funded Pension 
Insurance (MAPAS) 
 
It can be observed from the table that participants in Macedonia are most severely 
penalized in the case when they are switching funds. In addition, we have the highest 
entry fee. This might a bit misleading because 2.8% of those fees are going to 
                                                 
19 According to the Law the amount of entry fee cannot exceed 0.8%, management fee cannot 
exceed 1.2% and bank fee must be lower than 0.10%. Entry fee is paid on each contribution, 
Management fee is paid on yearly basis calculated as percentage of total pension fund assets, 
and Bank fee is paid as a percentage of yearly average pension fund assets. 
20 AZ is planning gradually to reduce the entry fee to 0.5% in the following 4 years. 
21 This fee includes 1.5% charged by the Agency for Supervision of Fully Funded Pension 
Insurance, 0.6% for Pension and Disability Insurance Fund of Macedonia, and 0.7% for the 
National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia. 
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Government Institutions (please see footnote 21 for detailed decomposition). From 
1st of July 2007 there will be a reduction in the fees from 8.5% to 7.9%. This is good 
but very small step forward. Finally, we have lowest management fees, which at this 
stage can be considered only as a potential advantage. This is important in the long-
run because the management fees have the highest burden on individual investment 
accounts. However, since we have ‘highly conservative’ and ‘passive’ (buy-and-hold) 
investment strategy they have insignificant importance. 
 
2. Investment Returns 
 
In this section we will run a model in order to see the hypothetical outcome of 
Macedonian, Bulgarian and Croatian investment returns. The assumptions of the 
model are presented in the following table. 
 
Table 5 
 
w – wage Same for all countries 
c – contribution 7.42% or according to our model 1 € each 
month for the next 40 years 
e – entry fee Average fee paid in the country 
Macedonia 7.9%22 
Croatia 0.7% 
Bulgaria 5% 
r – real rate of return Annual real rate of return23 
Macedonia 5% 
Croatia 6% 
Bulgaria 7% 
m – management fee Average annual fee paid in the country 
Macedonia 0.62% 
Croatia 1% 
Bulgaria 1% 
g – growth of earnings 3% salary growth on yearly basis 
T - time 40 years 
ir – investment return Please see equation (3) 
 
 
                                                 
22 In our calculation we used the fees from 1st of July 2007. 
23 The assumption regarding the annual real rates of return is based on current portfolio 
composition. In addition, we believe that those returns are overestimated for Macedonia while 
underestimated for Bulgaria and Croatia! 
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Each individual is expected to participate in the fund for 40 years (no exit fees are 
paid at the end of the period)24. Furthermore on 1st of January each year we assume 
that earnings are growing by 3%, which is good approximation of the wage 
bargaining process. 
( )Tgww +×= 1         (1) 
 
The contribution rate is paid as a percentage of earnings, decreased by the entry fee. 
In order to make appropriate comparison the monthly contribution rate is identical 
for all countries (7.42% of the salary or 1 euro €). 
( )ewc −××= 10742.0        (2) 
 
The annual rate of return (decreased by the management fees) is set according to 
expected returns of current pension funds portfolio. Finally, the investment return is 
calculated as sum of contributions and reinvestment of returns. 
( )∑
=
−+×=
T
t
t
t mrcir
1
1        (3)  
 
The following graph shows the developments of individual investment accounts over 
time. 
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24 The model also excludes the possibility of switching funds. 
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According to our model the average retirement income for Macedonians will be 
substantially lower when compared with Bulgaria and Croatia. This can be mainly 
explained by the portfolio composition. The ‘highly conservative’ and ‘passive’ buy-
and-hold investment strategy produces returns which are approximately 23% to 47% 
lower. Since we believe that the real returns in our model are overestimated for 
Macedonia while underestimated for Bulgaria and Croatia the difference (or the 
opportunity costs for the Macedonian participants) might be even higher at the end 
of the period! 
 
In addition, small part of the difference in returns can also be explained by the high 
level of fees and charges. In the previous section we raised the question “Since this type 
of portfolio composition can be easily managed even by unsophisticated and inexperienced investors 
why the Macedonian participants are paying for ‘entry’ and management fees?” If the same 
portfolio is managed by individuals than the difference in returns can be reduced 
from 23% to 12% (compared with Croatia) and from 47% to 33% (compared with 
Bulgaria). This can be easily observed from the following graph. 
 
Graph 2 
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3. Single vs. Multiple Portfolios 
 
A more recent and controversial issue in the area of investment regulation relates to 
the debate on single versus multiple portfolios. Let’s assume that the portfolios of 
pension funds in most countries are already reasonably diversified due to relaxation 
of investment restrictions and the increase in the share of equity and foreign assets. 
However, it has been argued that the overall degree of diversification is still 
insufficient because the portfolio composition across funds tends to be similar.25 
Since portfolios are identical participants do not have a choice between risk-return 
combinations offered by different investment strategies even in countries where 
switching is allowed. Consequently, young and old participants are forced to hold the 
same portfolio, which is sub-optimal for both. Young participants would favour 
portfolios with higher risk and liquidity premiums (i.e. with a larger share of equity). 
On the contrary, older participants usually require portfolios with less risk and greater 
liquidity (i.e. larger share of short-term, fixed-income securities). 
 
There are two possible solutions to overcome this problem. One proposition might 
be offering a choice of more than one portfolio for all participants. For countries 
such as Macedonia this requires adequate assessment of the costs and benefits. 
Another possible solution might be the replacement of the mandatory second pillar 
with voluntary DC scheme. In either case, the gains for the participants would mainly 
depend on whether they will make an informed decision or not about the 
composition of their portfolio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 For example, the Macedonian Pension Funds (NPF and KB POPF) have very similar 
portfolios (Source: MAPAS). 
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V. Concluding Remarks 
 
The objective of this paper was to analyze the issues that are important and should be 
taken into consideration by the regulators responsible for the Macedonian pension 
reform. 
 
Regarding the quantitative restriction, they are probably necessary when a reform is 
being introduced. Their aim is to strengthen the confidence in the entire system. 
However, at this stage they do not impose any investment constraints because 
Macedonian pension funds stayed well within their officially imposed limits. 
Nevertheless, we believe that they should be reconsidered especially having in mind 
the current situation in our economy and the level of development in our capital 
market. The key policy question is how quickly the system should be liberalised? In our opinion 
the relaxation of investment restriction must be a rapid process, were the medium-
term goal will be moving towards a ‘prudent-person’ rule. 
 
From the evidence presented in this paper it appears that Macedonian participants are 
encountering high opportunity cost. The first policy implication is that pension funds 
investment strategies should be reconsidered. Liberalization is necessary in order to 
allow appropriate diversification across instruments and countries. Secondly, the fees 
and charges are too high and should be immediately reassessed by the pension funds. 
However, this refers also refers to the government institutions. Thirdly, funds should 
be able to compete in offering different risk-return investment strategies to their 
participants. Instead of being forced to hold the same portfolio they should be able to 
choose according to their risk tolerance and age. If this is not possible than more 
radical solution might be the replacement of the mandatory second pillar with 
voluntary DC scheme. In this way the participants will be able to choose funds with 
clearly defined investment strategy (according to their ‘prospect’). In addition, this 
will create big incentives for improved efficiencies in investment management and 
performance because the retirement plans will be offered purely on a competitive 
basis. 
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